Considering your concerns, I hope you will advocate for changing witness votes to reflect how DPoS should actually work. Presently 1 Steem = 30 witness votes, which multiplies the advantage large stakeholders have 30x.
It is proposed that 1 Steem = 1 witness vote. This is how the community of stakeholders should effect governance via DPoS.
Thanks!
Id like to see multiple options be presented and scenarios played out to see which option is the best.
I resort to sound principle when considering things, and I think you tend to as well, which is why we agree so often. DPoS is based on stake creating and resulting from greater skin in the game, and stake should therefore be an accurate representation of governance, which 1 Steem = 1 vote is.
It isn't a matter of how it 'should' work. The current system is an approximation of approval voting (in fact, under true approval voting the number of votes would be unlimited, but this was changed not for any governance reason but due to an exploit concerning backup witnesses).
Approval voting has the property of electing the witnesses which are approved by the broadest and maximum amount of voting stake. Under most conditions this would be good, as it sets the maximum threshold for an attacker to come in with a narrow amount of stake and elect witnesses contrary to the broader consensus.
In this case, what people are trying to accomplish is not to represent the broadest and maximum amount of stake, but in fact handicap the largest stakeholder (who in fact has an absolute majority relative to actively voting stake). In a sense, this is exactly the opposite of what good, secure, governance would do.
That being said, it may be a reasonable tradeoff (lower security for less majority control) to limit the influence of the largest stakeholder in this specific situation.
Presently the witness voting system multiplies the advantage of substantial stakeholders 30x over lesser staked voters.
Given Steem's situation has evolved from when the founders held the stake they mined, and now that stake is no longer in the hands of the founders, it's best to remove the mechanism that allowed them to exercise instant governance of Steem at their sole option, which is what the 30x votepower did.
Theoretically the community could band together and prevent that stake from completely effecting control of consensus witnesses, sooner or later. In reality one stakeholder will be focused on a purpose, while hundreds or thousands will be diverse instead, and will be very unlikely to focus enough to successfully oppose that stake if it is deployed malevolently.
Tron could sell to Goolag, and then we'd end.
Representing stake 30x does not increase the range of stake represented. It simply increases the advantage large stakeholders have over lesser stakeholders by 30x.
It's a vast increase in security - not a decrease - to change witness voting to 1 Steem = 1 vote.
Presently the witness voting system multiplies the advantage of substantial stakeholders 30x over lesser staked voters
No it doesn't. Everyone has the same 30 votes, both big and small alike. Both stakes are multiplied to the extent that all 30 votes are used.
1 SP = 30 SP worth of votes
1 million SP = 30 million SP worth of votes.
There is no systematic multiplication of larger stake over smaller here.
What multiple votes (approaching the original full approval voting with unlimited votes) does do, among other things, mostly good, is a better job of translating the choices of the majority of stake into a full set of witnesses acceptable to the largest share of stake, and protected against smaller share attackers.
Given Steem's situation has evolved from when the founders held the stake they mined, and now that stake is no longer in the hands of the founders
I don't necessarily disagree with your point here, but realize that what you are proposing is enabling a sort of "attack" where the minority stake (about 40%) is given increased power, because in this case we've decided that the majority (about 60%) happens to no longer be owned by founders, and that is "no good".
That certainly 'feels' like a good thing in this particular situation, but it wouldn't feel like a good thing if the 40% were in the hands of someone trying to cause damage and the 60% were in "good" hands. The existing system is more secure because it would keeps that from happening; the proposed one would not.
Again, this could be an acceptable, even perhaps desirable, tradeoff, but don't fail to recognize it for what it is.
You can say what you want to, but the example you pose proves my point. The holder of 1 Million SP gained 29 Million, while the holder of 1 SP gained 29, a difference of 28,999,971 in favor of the larger stakeholder. The 30x increase in SP of larger stakeholders dramatically increases their influence over the witnesses, and I reckon the founders did this in order to be able to attain instant total control of Steem governance at their sole option, which the founder's stake enabled.
It enables that control still, but the founders no longer possess it.
If removing the back door to total control over Steem, and the massive grant of power to larger stakeholders over lesser, is considered an 'attack' then so is surgery for cancer.
There is no reason to continue practices that benefited the founders when those founders are no longer here.
Honestly that is a silly argument. In any system of votes if you multiply everyone's votes by 2 or 10 or 1/2 or a million, everyone still has the same share of the votes.
The multiplication does not do what you claim.
There are good reasons for approval-type voting in this context which have nothing to do with the founders wanting to have had complete control. In fact, originally the founders had a much larger share than Tron has now, and probably would have had complete control even under the system you propose.
What you are trying to do is give more influence to a distinct minority stake. That's laudable in some sense, but you can't avoid recognizing that weakens the security of the chain, which relies on: a) the majority being honest, and b) maximizing the threshold that a dishonest minority much reach in order to gain influence.
"In any system of votes if you multiply everyone's votes by 2 or 10 or 1/2 or a million, everyone still has the same share of the votes."
I disagree that this is equitable, because witness votes are measured in Steem voted them. While proportions may remain relatively the same, in real terms the larger stakes effect greater influence over the witnesses. 30M votes greatly outweighs 3M votes in an election, and it doesn't matter at all that they are proportionately the same to the actual stake of the voters. In real votes they are dramatically divergent, and that's how witness votes are counted.
But you know that.
"What you are trying to do is give more influence to a distinct minority stake."
Well, what I am seeking to do is to eliminate the massive over representation of substantial stakeholders to influence the witnesses by multiplying their VP 30 fold. They already have most of the stake. Letting them vote it 30 times increases their influence, which is already greater than all the redfish and minnows together, 30 fold more. Doing that does increase the influence of the majority of voters, so despite phrasing it pejoratively as if it were undue granting of privilege, it is technically increasing the influence of the majority of voters, by reducing the undue influence that has previously been granted whales, so that the founder's stake could exercise instant at will control of the governance of the chain. While the founder's stake was not deployed, the whales enjoyed 30x the influence on the witnesses their stakes merited over redfish, minnows, and dolphins.
What is necessary to improve security of the witnesses with the founders stake in the wild now, is to eliminate that disproportionate influence allowing that massive stake to vote 30 times. The witnesses aren't voted proportionately, but actually. The Steem backing them is what counts. Larger stakes voting once wield 30x less Steem in real terms than they do voting 30x.
But you know that.
"...the security of the chain, which relies on: a) the majority being honest, and b) maximizing the threshold that a dishonest minority much reach in order to gain influence."
This is no justification for granting large stakeholders 30x more votes. That's a ludicrous argument, because whales and orcas alone wield more stake than all redfish, minnows, and dolphins combined. Those lesser stakeholders, the majority of the voters, aren't the threat to the security of the chain.
It's the whales that are the minority with a majority stake that is a threat to the security of the chain, and particularly the one stakeholder with ~1/3 of extant stake, because 30x over representation grants them inordinate power to influence the witnesses.
Do not misrepresent these facts any longer. It is facile to see through your mischaracterization.
We will mostly have to agree to disagree.
But one last time:
and particularly the one stakeholder with ~1/3 of extant stake, because 30x over representation grants them inordinate power to influence the witnesses.
Except that it is isn't 'inordinate'. In a perfectly fair system, a vastly larger stake should have vastly larger influence. In simple election terms, 51% wins and 49% loses (though in this case it is more like 60% and 40%). We just don't really like that outcome at the moment, so we try to come up with voting rules that gives 49% a chance at some sort of partial win, blunting the influence of the vastly larger stake. This obviously also gives any minority attackers a chance at a partial win, making the chain less secure in general.
I will agree that I am disagreeable. I just tossed you a witness vote BTW. You clearly have the patience of Job and the diligence of Noah coupled to a sincere dedication to Steem to have spent the time and effort to discuss this with me.
Thanks!